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Abstract
We present a formal framework for characterising plug-in relationships between
components whereby one does not cause the other to deadlock. We deﬁne the
notion of a stable relation φ between co-operating processes such that whenever
P and Q are related by φ, then any component-wise reﬁnements P ′ and Q ′ are
related by φ. We use stable relations to ensure that plug-in components can be
separately reﬁned whilst maintaining integrity of the original relational properties.
We ground our notions in the CSP failures semantic model. The aim is to underpin
a mixed-paradigm approach combining diﬀerent speciﬁcation methods, including
state-based deductive formalisms such as Action Systems, and event-based model
checking formalisms such as CSP/FDR. The objective is to play to the strengths
and overcome limitations of each technique, by treating diﬀerent system aspects
with individual tools and notations which are most appropriate.
1 Introduction
A formal method is a mathematically-based theory which is used to describe
and reason about the behaviour of a computer system. Application of a formal
method encompasses speciﬁcation of the system in a chosen formal notation,
analysis and veriﬁcation of key properties and stepwise reﬁnement to a correct
implementation. It is generally recognised that even partial use of these tech-
niques during development can signiﬁcantly increase the quality of software
and hardware systems, with respect to correctness and maintainability. For
example, the application of a general-purpose speciﬁcation notation such as
Z [24] has been found to lead to the earlier discovery of design ﬂaws. Formal
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modelling and veriﬁcation of small security protocols such as that by Lowe and
Roscoe [14], Lowe [13] and Meadows [15] has revealed previously unsuspected
ﬂaws in the operation of these protocols.
Many diﬀerent formal methods with diﬀering theoretical bases have been
proposed. An overview of formalisms, as given in [7,10], testiﬁes to a variety
of approaches and methods. No one formalism is fully suitable for all aspects
of industrial-sized applications, as we have illustrated by directly comparing
strengths and weaknesses of state-based, deductive reasoning approaches and
event-based, model checking approaches applied to a distributed mail system
[19] and general routing protocols [20]. With a deductive reasoning approach,
a speciﬁcation gives an abstract description of the signiﬁcant behaviour of
the required system. This behaviour can be veriﬁed for the deﬁned imple-
mentation by proving the theorems which constitute the rules of reﬁnement.
With model checking, a speciﬁcation corresponds to a formula or property
which can be exhaustively evaluated on a speciﬁc ﬁnite domain representing
an implementation. Deductive reasoning is more general, but only partially
automatable. Model checking is more limited but fully automatable. Our pre-
vious work [19] shows that in addition to theoretical limitations of a notation,
its form leads towards speciﬁcation of a certain style and often with particular
implicit assumptions.
Combining diﬀerent formalisms potentially oﬀers a fuller picture, but the
question remains as to how this integration can best be achieved. A number
of options are available. A uniﬁed notation may be applied throughout, but
possibly at the expense of prohibitive complexity and lack of optimality for
individual parts of the system. Alternatively, specifying diﬀerent system as-
pects in diﬀerent notations is attractive, particularly for greater ﬂexibility in
incorporating “oﬀ-the-shelf” components which ideally come with some guar-
antee of their behaviour. In a distributed system it can be the case that a
transaction or service requires the interoperation of a chain of components
and services which combine to produce (hopefully) a desired result. Various
components may be selected as oﬀ-the-shelf products to plug-in to a partic-
ular application. The correct operation of the application depends not only
on the integrity of its own functions, but also on its interactions with other
components.
Our aim is to provide a framework in which components of a system can be
speciﬁed and developed independently in diﬀerent notations, with constraints
on their interfaces ensuring appropriate cooperation so that the speciﬁcation
of the overall system can be satisﬁed. We develop a relational view of com-
ponents, with one acting as a plug-in to the other if it does not increase the
possibilities of deadlock. This view has the advantage of oﬀering a mechanism
to specify minimal interface properties required of a plug-in component, but
in general it lacks stability, by which we mean being preserved by reﬁnement.
The notations chosen are CSP [12,21] for event-based speciﬁcation and
model checking, and Action Systems [1] which allow state-based description
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and deductive reasoning. We show by examples that certain desirable rela-
tional properties of a system with arbitrary components are not necessarily
preserved by component-wise reﬁnements, and we describe a solution for avoid-
ing this reﬁnement paradox. We conclude by placing our work in the context
of other research linking the two notations, notably, that by Morgan [16],
Butler [4] and Treharne and Schneider [25,26].
The papers is organised as follows. In section 2, we motivate our ap-
proach with a simple example of a subscription database. In section 3, we
give an overview of our work. Section 4 contains a brief introduction to CSP.
In section 5, we provide examples illustrating desirable relationships between
components, and that such relationships are not in general preserved by reﬁne-
ment, which we regard as unstable. In section 6, we provide CSP formulations
of relationships which are stable, and deﬁne our notion of a plug-in relation-
ship. Section 7 brieﬂy revisits the database example. In section 8 we discuss
comparisons with other work, and present conclusions.
2 Interoperating components: an example
Consider a secure database which answers requests for information from autho-
rised customers. We wish to treat the functional properties of the subscription
database and authorisation protocol as separate units which can be further
developed and veriﬁed separately in diﬀerent ways as appropriate. The infor-
mation retrieval services are best treated with a state-based formalism such
as Action Systems, while the key-exchange protocol is most eﬀectively treated
with a ﬁnite-automata, exhaustive state search technique such as CSP.
Correct operation of the state-based information retrieval services would
rely on a crypto-protocol speciﬁcation ultimately implemented with a suitable
plug-in component, which as a separate concern may range from providing
only simple key exchange through to providing additional authorization and
integrity. The speciﬁcation simply needs to state that a necessary task will be
performed (such as, a common session key being distributed to both database
and client), with no need to place constraints on the values it requires, nor
on the steps required to execute the crypto-protocol. We wish to outline the
required task in the main speciﬁcation for the system and hand over to a more
concrete protocol for the details. The top level speciﬁcation of the protocol
should give us suﬃcient guarantees of its behaviour in order that it, and any
more concrete reﬁnement of it, be considered compatible as a plug-in to our
system speciﬁcation. In this paper we explore what constitutes a compatible
plug-in which can be veriﬁed as such.
Figure 1 gives part of a top level speciﬁcation for the database written
as an Action System. An Action System incorporates both a description of
the state variables and the eﬀects of each action upon them, and the order
in which execution may occur. The full speciﬁcation of which this is a small
part deﬁnes the state of the database and the mechanisms required to serve
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Actions of database obtaining key for communication with user u
for u ∈ USR action GetKeyu : −
status(u) = startsession −→ status(u) := needkey
for u ∈ USR action GotKeyu in k? : KEY : −
status(u) = needkey −→ status(u), key(u) := haskey , k?
Fig. 1. Action System speciﬁcation for part of secure database system
requests from valid customers. Conditions such as clearance to access data
can be succinctly captured and veriﬁed with this formalism. In contrast,
other tasks such as developing and verifying a suitable key exchange protocol
between the parties is not best-suited to the Action System notation. The
Action System speciﬁcation states the requirement for this in general terms
(these are the actions in Figure 1) with a key request and expected response
for any particular user u. Each action is of the form g −→ c where g is a
guard determining when the action may be executed and c is the command
which is executed when the action is selected.
A detailed understanding of Action Systems is not required here, and the
interested reader is directed to the work of Morgan [16] and that of Butler [5,6].
It is worth noting that status and key are examples of state variables charac-
teristic of this style of formalism. At this point, we wish to “hand over” to a
suitable protocol, very possibly developed using a diﬀerent notation, in this
case, CSP.
3 Combining speciﬁcations – an overview
The traces/failures/divergences models, described in the next section, provide
a unifying formal semantics for Action Systems and CSP so that we can com-
bine speciﬁcations in a meaningful way. That is, if P is an Action Systems
speciﬁcation for some aspect or component of a system, and Q is a CSP speci-
ﬁcation for another aspect or component, then P ‖ Q represents their parallel
combination with behaviour well-deﬁned, and any safety (that is, trace) prop-
erty of either P or Q with respect to their common actions/events is preserved
by P ‖ Q .
In contrast to safety properties, liveness properties are not preserved by
the ‖ operator, as illustrated by Example 5.1 below. Our focus is on plug-in
relationships among components, whereby we mean that component Q plugs
in to component P iﬀ Q does not cause P to deadlock when they are run
in parallel. We formalise this notion (a desirable behaviour for a plug-in
component to oﬀer its controller), and show by example that unfortunately,
more deterministic reﬁnements of processes satisfying such a relationship do
not themselves have to satisfy the relationship.
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Our solution for avoiding this potential pitfall (“reﬁnement paradox”) is
to characterise P and Q with a stronger plug-in relationship which (1) implies
Q does not deadlock P , and (2) is preserved by reﬁnement. This is analogous
to establishing a non-invariant post condition for a loop using a stronger loop
invariant; the desired post condition on its own is not necessarily suﬃciently
strong to be invariant, but can be deduced from a stronger predicate which is
invariant.
4 An introduction to CSP
CSP [12] models a system as a process which interacts with its environment
by means of atomic events. Communication is synchronous: an event takes
place precisely when both process and environment agree on its occurrence.
This rather than assignments to shared variables is the fundamental means of
interaction between agents. CSP is a process algebra.
A related series of semantic models capture diﬀerent aspects of observ-
able behaviours of processes: traces, failures and divergences. The simplest
semantic model is based on the concept of a trace: a ﬁnite sequence of events
drawn from an alphabet set Σ of all events. A trace for a process represents a
sequence of events which a process could be observed to perform. The traces
model characterises a process as the set of all traces, traces(P), it can perform.
The traces model is suﬃcient for reasoning about safety properties. In the fail-
ures model [2] a process P is modelled as a set of failures. A failure is a pair
(s ,X ) for s a ﬁnite trace of events of α(P), and X a subset of events of α(P);
(s ,X ) ∈ failures(P) means that P may engage in the sequence s and then
refuse all of the events in X . The set X is called a refusal. The failures model
allows reasoning about certain liveness properties. More complex models such
as failures/divergences [3] and timed failures/divergences [17] have more struc-
tures allowing ﬁner distinctions to support more powerful reasoning. For the
rest of this paper, we restrict our discussion to the failures model.
We say that a process P is a reﬁnement of process S (S  P) if any
possible behaviour of P is also a possible behaviour of S :
failures(P) ⊆ failures(S )
which tells us that any trace of P is a trace of S , and P can refuse an event
x after engaging in trace s , only if S can refuse x after engaging in s .
Intuitively, suppose S (for “speciﬁcation”) is a process for which all be-
haviours it permits are in some sense acceptable. If P reﬁnes S , then any
behaviour of P is as acceptable as any behaviour of S . S can represent an
idealised model of a system’s behaviour, or an abstract property correspond-
ing to a correctness constraint, such as deadlock or livelock freedom. A wide
range of correctness conditions can be encoded as reﬁnement checks between
processes. Mechanical reﬁnement checking is provided by Formal Systems’
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model checker, FDR [11]. An overview of CSP syntax and a failures model is
given in the Appendices.
5 Combining Components
We view our top-level speciﬁcation as being structured as a set of interopera-
ble speciﬁcations whose parallel combination describes desirable properties of
the system. As noted in section 3, that each component satisﬁes a desirable
liveness condition does not guarantee that the parallel combination satisﬁes
the condition. Example 5.1 sets the scene for characterising the suitability of
one speciﬁcation “plugging in” to another.
Example 5.1 Suppose process P makes a request (event a) to receive two
keys (events k1 and k2). P does not care in which order the keys are obtained.
Here ✷ represents external choice.
P = (a → k1→ k2→ P)✷(a → k2→ k1→ P)
Process Q is a component which is chosen to distribute keys, and this
happens to be speciﬁed as responding ﬁrst with k1 and then with k2.
Q = a → k1→ k2→ Q
It is expected that establishing the keys as speciﬁed by Q will be achieved
by some more detailed algorithm which, with internal details hidden, reﬁnes
Q . We regard Q as a plug-in to P , since their joint behaviour expressed by
P ‖ Q behaves desirably. Clearly not every process which returns keys should
be regarded as a plug-in to P . For example, consider R:
R = a → k1→ k1→ R
This time R does not interact with P in a desirable way since it does not have
a acceptable pattern of behaviour, and the result is deadlock at the third step.
✷
Reﬁnement brings additional diﬃculties. Reﬁnement has various desirable
properties, such as transitivity and monotonicity which are very useful for
compositional development. These properties allow us to know that whenever
a speciﬁcation is good enough for some purpose, then so is any reﬁnement.
However, Example 5.2 below shows that if we are dealing with relationships
between component processes which ensure that their parallel combination
describes desirable properties of our system, it does not follow that component-
wise reﬁnements are suitable according to the same criteria. That is, for a
relation ρ on processes, if
Pρ Q , P  P ′ and Q  Q ′
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then by monotonicity we know that
P ‖ Q  P ′ ‖ Q ′
but it is not necessarily true that
P ′ρ Q ′
Example 5.2 Suppose P and Q are both deﬁned as follows:
P = (x → P)  STOP
Q = (x → Q)  STOP
Here  represents internal (nondeterministic) choice. We observe that P
and Q satisfy the relationship:
P  P ‖ Q
(this relationship might appear desirable since it ensures that Q cannot cause
any deadlock not also allowed by P). P and Q satisfy this property, but not
reﬁnements:
P ′ = x → P ′ Q ′ = STOP
Clearly P  P ′ and Q  Q ′ and yet P ′ 	 P ′ ‖ Q ′.
✷
Example 5.2 shows that potential candidates for describing suitable plug-in
relationships between components may not be preserved by reﬁnement. This
would be disastrous from the point of view of building systems with indepen-
dently developed components. In this paper we concentrate on patterns of
interaction between two processes P and Q which, as in Example 5.1 above,
behave like a simple remote procedure call from P to Q . We regard Q as a
plug-in to P if Q responds to P in a way which does not increase the oppor-
tunities for deadlock, and for any component-wise reﬁnements Q ′ and P ′, Q ′
responds to P ′ in a way which does not increase the opportunities for deadlock
to P ′. In the rest of the paper, we investigate how to formalise these notions.
We ﬁrst deﬁne a general property of relations which is useful for capturing the
notion that reﬁnements of processes inherit their parents’ relationship.
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Stable Relations) Let φ and ρ each be a relation on X . We
say that φ is stable with ρ iﬀ for xφy , xρx ′, yρy ′, then x ′φy ′.
Example 5.4 Let R be the relation < and S the relation which holds between
x and y iﬀ y = x +1. Then R is stable with S . This example also shows that




In general, relations are not stable with themselves, for example, the rela-
tion < is not stable with <. Equivalence relations are stable with themselves,
though not in general stable with arbitrary other relations.
6 Stability with Reﬁnement
We can capture the notion that a given relationship φ between co-operating
speciﬁcations is inherited by reﬁnements by requiring φ to be stable with .
We say that φ is stable whenever
PφQ ∧ P  P ′ ∧ Q  Q ′ ⇒ P ′φQ ′
We can make the relationship given in Example 5.2 stable by requiring not
only that P  P ‖ Q but also that P is deterministic. However this does not
oﬀer a general solution to this “reﬁnement paradox”; it may defeat the purpose
of reﬁnement since it disallows the use of nondeterminism as a mechanism for
abstraction. We might instead insist that P and Q always operate together in
a deadlock free fashion. We cannot ensure this by simply requiring that each
of P and Q is deadlock free, as illustrated by
P =
T
x → P and Q =
T
x → Q .
P and Q are each deadlock free since each is willing to do some event of T ,
but P ‖ Q can deadlock whenever they do not agree on their chosen events.
However, if we require P ‖ Q to be deadlock free as well, Example 6.1 below
ensures that any reﬁnements P ′ and Q ′ inherit their parents’ good behaviour
and so cannot deadlock when they themselves are run in parallel.
Example 6.1 Processes P and Q are mutually deadlock free iﬀ each of P
and Q is deadlock free, and their parallel composition is deadlock free. Mutual
deadlock freedom is stable.
A process is deadlock free iﬀ it reﬁnes the process DF which is always




Let DF  P , DF  Q , and DF  P ‖ Q . Also let P  P ′ and Q  Q ′.
Then it follows by monotonicity and transitivity that DF  P ′, DF  Q ′,
and P ‖ Q  P ′ ‖ Q ′, and DF  P ′ ‖ Q ′.
✷
Mutual deadlock freedom, though stable, is too strong a property to require
of co-operating applications Q and P for which Q responds to a one-time
invocation from P . For example, Q may be a set-up process which P calls
once and only once. Thus, P ‖ Q will properly deadlock on their joint alphabet
after Q ﬁnishes its work, whilst P carries on with other events not requiring
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any participation from Q . Or Q behaves as a remote procedure call to P ,
which may acceptably never invoke any services provided by Q . Indeed, we
may wish to allow P itself to deadlock.
Let us imagine that we want P to trigger Q by handing over some param-
eters, which Q processes, subsequently returning results back to P . P is in
control, and may invoke Q arbitrarily, including never; Q is always required
to be ready, and is willing to be invoked forever. What is required is a sta-
ble relation between P and Q which implies that their parallel combination
deadlocks on their set of common events, J , only where P chooses. Then, if
we reﬁne P and Q with P ′ and Q ′, the parallel combination of P ′ and Q ′
deadlocks on J only where P ′ chooses.
We now identify stable relations between P and Q which imply that Q
does not deadlock P . For the rest of the paper, we assume J represents the
set of common events requiring participation by P and Q , that is, the events
requiring synchronization by both processes. We assume that P may engage
in events outside J , but Q does not (other events may be regarded as internal
to Q). The ﬁrst deﬁnition characterises interactions between processes P and
Q whereby whenever P is ready to output a value x on the channel T to Q ,
then Q is ready to receive it.
Deﬁnition 6.2 Q listens on T to P , for T ⊆ J means
x ∈ T ∧ s  〈x 〉 ∈ traces(P) ∧ s ∈ traces(P ‖J Q)
⇒ (s  J , {x}) /∈ failures(Q)
Theorem 6.3 The relation listens on T to is stable.
Proof. Assume
(1)P  P ′ and Q  Q ′
(2) x ∈ T ∧ s  〈x 〉 ∈ traces(P) ∧ s ∈ traces(P ‖J Q)
⇒ (s  J , {x}) /∈ failures(Q)
We must show
x ∈ T ∧ s  〈x 〉 ∈ traces(P ′) ∧ s ∈ traces(P ′ ‖J Q ′)
⇒ (s  J , {x}) /∈ failures(Q ′)
Assume the hypothesis of the implication. By (1) s  〈x 〉 ∈ traces(P) and
s ∈ traces(P ‖J Q). Thus by (2), (s  J , {x}) /∈ failures(Q), and again by (1)
(s  J , {x}) /∈ failures(Q ′). ✷
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We next deﬁne a stable property which characterises a process Q out-
putting along channel R whenever P wants. We do not want to overly con-
strain Q , that is, Q should be allowed to deadlock on R whenever P is willing
to do so. If we require that P either must be prepared to accept any answer
communicated by Q , or possibly deadlock – but not both simultaneously –
then the relation is stable. The following deﬁnition characterises processes P
and Q whereby whenever P is ready to receive input from Q , Q is ready to
send it. It says that whenever P is ready to receive any value of R – there is
an obligation on P to be ready to receive any other value as well, and there
is an obligation on Q be ready to output something.
Deﬁnition 6.4 Q answers on R to P, for R ⊆ J means
x ∈ R ∧ y ∈ R ∧ s  〈x 〉 ∈ traces(P) ∧ s ∈ traces(Q)  J
⇒ (s  J ,R) /∈ failures(Q)  J ∧ (s , {y}) /∈ failures(P)
Theorem 6.5 The relation answers on R to is stable.
Proof. Assume
(1)P  P ′ and Q  Q ′
(2) x ∈ R ∧ y ∈ R ∧ s  〈x 〉 ∈ traces(P) ∧ s ∈ traces(P ‖J Q)
⇒ (s  J ,R) /∈ failures(Q) ∧ (s , {y}) /∈ failures(P)
Let
x ∈ R ∧ y ∈ R ∧ s  〈x 〉 ∈ traces(P ′) ∧ s ∈ traces(P ′ ‖J Q ′)
We must show
(s  J ,R) /∈ failures(Q ′) ∧ (s , {y}) /∈ failures(P ′)
Assume (s  J ,R) ∈ failures(Q ′). By (1), (s  J ,R) ∈ failures(Q), and
furthermore, s  〈x 〉 ∈ traces(P) and s ∈ traces(P ‖J Q). Thus by (2),
(s  J ,R) /∈ failures(Q), and this contradiction establishes that (s  J ,R) /∈
failures(Q ′). Assume (s , {y}) ∈ failures(P ′). Again by (1), (s , {y}) ∈ failures(P),
but this contradicts (2) thereby establishing the theorem. ✷
The next theorem establishes that if Q listens on T to P , and Q answers on
R to P , then Q does not deadlock P on their common set of events, J = T∪R.
Theorem 6.6 If Q listens on T to P and Q answers on R for T ∪ R = J ,
then (s , J ) ∈ failures(P ‖J Q) ⇒ (s , J ) ∈ failures(P).
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Proof. Assume (s , J ) ∈ failures(P ‖J Q). By failures model deﬁnition for
the parallel operator (see Appendix), for some refusal sets X ,Y , X ∪Y = J ,
s ∈ traces(P) and s  J ∈ traces(Q) and (s ,X ) ∈ failures(P), and (s 
J ,Y ) ∈ failures(Q). Assume there exists and x ∈ J such that s  〈x 〉 ∈
traces(P). There are two cases : x ∈ T or x ∈ R.
Case 1. Assume x ∈ T . Since Q listens on T to P , (s  J , {x}) /∈ failures(Q).
Since (s  J ,Y ) ∈ failures(Q), then by failures axiom (M3) which says that
any subset of a refusal set is itself a refusal set, it follows that x /∈ Y . This
contradicts that X ∪ Y = J , and case is proved.
Case 2. Assume x ∈ R. Since Q answers on R to P , (s  J ,R) /∈ failures(Q).
Furthermore, (s , {y}) /∈ failures(P) for any y ∈ R. By (M3), it follows that
X ∩R = {}. Hence R ⊆ Y and again by (M3), (s  J ,R) ∈ failures(Q). This
contradiction proves the case and the theorem. ✷
The above theorem ensures that whenever the parallel system could refuse
all of the ﬁxed set J , then the speciﬁcation for P alone allows it to refuse J .
It follows that if at any point several possible events are acceptable to P , Q
will be compatible as long as it permits at least one of these events.
We use this notion to give a deﬁnition of a plug-in relationship:
Deﬁnition 6.7 Q plugs into P on A for A ⊆ J means
(s ,A) ∈ failures(P ‖J Q)⇒ (s ,A) ∈ failures(P)
This relation constrains Q to deadlock only when P might. But it is not
stable. For the processes deﬁned below, Q plugs into P on R (both behave
chaotically), but for the reﬁnements, Q ′ does not plug into P ′ on R.
Example 6.8 P = (✷
R
r → P) STOP





r → Q) STOP
Q ′ = STOP
✷
If Q is a plug-in to P on channels T and R, it would be tempting to
generalize theorem 6.6 that Q is a plug-in to P on T ∪ R. However, this is
not in general true, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 6.9
P = a → P b → P
Q = a → Q b → Q
Since for any s ∈ traces(P), (s , {a}) ∈ failures(P) and (s , {b}) ∈ failures(P)
(s , {a}) ∈ failures(P ‖J Q)⇒ (s , {a}) ∈ failures(P)





KeyX (u) = GetKey .u → 
k :KEY
GotKey .u!k → KeyX (u)
Q = |||u:USR KeyX (u)
Fig. 2. CSP speciﬁcation for key-exchange plug-in to secure database system
but (s , {a, b}) ∈ failures(P ‖J Q) and (s , {a, b}) /∈ failures(P). Thus, Q
plugs in to P on {a} and also on {b}, but not on {a, b}. ✷
Summary We have identiﬁed a notion of one process Q being as live as
another process P , whereby we mean that Q introduces no more possibilities
for deadlock than P . The examples show that there is a conﬂict between
allowing nondeterminism in speciﬁcations for P and Q , and preserving this
liveness relationship under reﬁnement. We have identiﬁed a notion of a plug-in
relationship between P and Q , which requires that this liveness relationship
is preserved by component-wise reﬁnements.
The listening and answering relations between P and Q deﬁned above
ensure that Q acts as a stable plug-in to P , with P nondeterministically
triggering Q , which returns results back to P . If Q listens on T to P , and
Q answers on R to P , for J = T ∪ R then Q plugs-in to P , and if P  P ′
and Q  Q ′ then Q ′ plugs-in to P . Thus we can conﬁdently reﬁne P and Q
separately, without having to verify that the reﬁnements cooperate as desired.
7 CSP plug-in to an Action System speciﬁcation
The relations that we have deﬁned provide a means of ensuring that two pro-
cesses can be separately developed, whilst maintaining integrity of combined
behaviour.
Suppose we have a CSP speciﬁcation for a key exchange protocol Q as
given in Figure 2. It simply describes a process which is always willing to
communicate on the GetKey channel and accept any user u as input, and
subsequently distribute a common key to the server and user, in nondeter-
ministic order. It is deliberately abstract to allow for a variety of speciﬁc key
distribution protocols. This can be viewed as a “minimum speciﬁcation” of
the key exchange to be reﬁned and veriﬁed as a separately. Our ultimate goal
is to plug this in to the Action System and show that the behaviour allowed
by the CSP plug-in is acceptable to the database speciﬁcation. Intuitively, we
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see that Q – speciﬁed in CSP – behaves as a suitable plug-in characterised
in the previous section, to P – speciﬁed in Action Systems in Figure 1:
Q listens on GetKey to P , and for each user u, Q answers on GotKey .u to
P .
The semantic links between Action Systems and CSP (see Section 8) provide
the mechanisms to integrate these separate views given in the two notations.
How most eﬀectively to check that component speciﬁcations above satisfy
these relational properties is a challenging problem under research.
There are various aspects of the CSP speciﬁcation which we might want
to further develop through reﬁnement. One is to unfold speciﬁc details of a
chosen key exchange protocol by describing an intended implementation, or an
oﬀ-the-shelf component. This might introduce a trusted key server together
with a prescribed sequence of events required by the protocol between user
clients and the database server. We can verify that the implementation is
valid by checking that it with the new events hidden is a reﬁnement of Q ,
thus establishing that the chosen protocol behaves as expected.
A signiﬁcant advantage of treating the security protocol as a suitable CSP
plug-in is that we can naturally specify event-based behaviour and check rel-
evant properties automatically using the FDR model checker, perhaps with
various induction techniques (for example [8,9]) and data independence tech-
niques (for example [21,22]) for transcending bounded state. A signiﬁcant
disadvantage of using Action Systems for such aspects is that properly speci-
fying allowable sequences of actions is very awkward.
Another reason for reﬁning the CSP speciﬁcation is that we might want to
analyse behaviour of a chosen protocol with respect to security, e.g., robustness
against deliberate or inadvertent attacks by intruders. Demonstrating security
or (lack of it) might involve modelling attackers as processes with certain
constrained behaviour, such as not having the ability to decipher encrypted
messages, whilst having the ability to intercept and replay communications
containing cipher text [13,14]. For example, Lowe and Roscoe [14] discover
potential security ﬂaws with the TMN key exchange protocol, revealed by
counter examples provided by FDR showing that attackers could perform
operations speciﬁcally disallowed by the CSP speciﬁcation. Again, adding
detail involves introducing internal actions, and checking that the new system
is a valid reﬁnement. A disadvantage of Action Systems for this sort of analysis
is that automated deductive reasoning tools cannot generally provide counter
examples for ﬂawed conjectures.
8 Relation to other work and conclusions
Butler has developed a tool csp2b [5,6] which provides a means of combin-
ing CSP with standard B speciﬁcations. The technique builds on weakest-
precondition formulations for Action Systems given by Morgan [16] and But-
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ler [4]. CSP-like descriptions are translated into machine readable B speci-
ﬁcations, which can then be veriﬁed by a deductive tool. Event-based CSP
descriptions and state-based Action System-like ones are combined into one
B machine, with appropriate proof obligations to ensure liveness properties of
the system.
In contrast, our desire is to modularise both speciﬁcation and analysis from
the beginning in order to reduce eﬀort and space explosion for those systems
where it is possible. Treharne and Schneider [25,26] provide techniques for
using CSP and the B-method. They deﬁne CSP control executives for state-
changing operations based on the B-method. They identify wp-formulated
proof obligations on the CSP speciﬁcations to ensure that appropriate pre-
conditions and guards (which they distinguish) are not violated. They do not
generate an encompassing B machine, and do not allow shared state. Thus
independent analysis of the separate speciﬁcations is possible.
The main focus of Butler, Treharne and Schneider approaches has been
to use CSP as a convenient way to specify constraints on the sequencing of,
i.e., controlling the state-based actions. Here we have taken the opposite
perspective: we want the state-based actions to control the CSP. In order to
accomplish this we require relational constraints to characterise a notion of
minimum requirements for a plug-in component: the plug-in must operate
under the control of the main component in that the combination deadlocks
only at the behest of the main.
We identify stability between speciﬁcations, which both simpliﬁes proof
obligations for top-level components and removes the need for re-establishing
proof obligations for reﬁnements, which would otherwise be required. We
are concerned with characterising suitable, possibly oﬀ-the-shelf, plug-ins; our
techniques allow us to view the Action System and CSP speciﬁcation tech-
niques as symmetric – either can describe plug-ins to the other. However our
deﬁnitions so far are formulated in CSP and the best way to exploit the seman-
tic link for veriﬁcation between diﬀerent notations is the subject of ongoing
research.
Our notion of stability is a very strong requirement for component speci-
ﬁcations, but it brings commensurate advantages in capturing the essence of
loosely coupled components and reducing veriﬁcation eﬀort. Our approach is
to do the hard work of proof for general paradigms of loosely coupled compo-
nents, such as our theorems about listening and answering. We then reap the
beneﬁt when using any Action System and CSP speciﬁcations which ﬁt the
patterns. Since many plug-in relationships ﬁt this paradigm, we can have a
signiﬁcant reduction of eﬀort.
In formulating stable properties we have a diﬃculty similar to that of non-
interference properties in security. Many diﬀerent variants are possible and
the eﬀects are not always apparent until pathological examples are examined.
Our notions of listening and answering are not fully general and variations may
be required for diﬀerent patterns of communication between components.
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Automated checking of stable relational properties is desirable. We give
a formulation of the listening and answering properties which can be model-
checked by FDR [18]. This involves transforming the original system of com-
ponents into a modiﬁed system, which can be checked against specialised
speciﬁcations.
Our driving motivation is to contain inherent problems of scale in applying
formal techniques to large applications. The goal of a great deal of current
research is to combine diﬀerent formal approaches in order to treat diﬀerent
aspects of a given system. There is a danger that combining techniques for
a particular system creates prohibitive complexity. Our aim is to divide and
conquer potential complexity by structuring separation-of-concerns speciﬁca-
tions early in the development process, so that independent analysis can be
eﬀectively performed. Finally we note that our techniques are formulated
using Action Systems and CSP, but we feel that concepts which we have iden-
tiﬁed are generally applicable to other formal and semi-formal speciﬁcation
techniques.
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Appendix A. A brief overview of CSP
The CSP language is a means of describing components of systems, processes
whose external actions are the communication or refusal of instantaneous
atomic events. All the participants in an event must agree on its performance.
STOP is the simplest CSP process; it never engages in any action, never
terminates.
SKIP similarly never performs any action, but instead terminates success-
fully, passing control to the next process in sequence (see P ; Q below).
a → P is the most basic program constructor. It waits to perform the event
a and after this has occurred it behaves as process P . The same notation is
used for outputs ( c!v → P ) and inputs (c?x → P(x ) ) of values on named
channels.
PQ is nondeterministic or internal choice. It may behave as P or Q
arbitrarily.
P✷Q is external or deterministic choice. It ﬁrst oﬀers the initial actions of
both P and Q to its environment. Its subsequent behaviour is like P if the
initial action chosen was possible only for P , and similarly for Q . If P and
Q have common initial actions, its subsequent behaviour is nondeterminis-
tic (like ). A deterministic choice between STOP and another process,
STOP✷P is identical to P .
P ‖ Q is parallel (concurrent) composition. P and Q evolve separately, but
events in the intersection of their alphabets occur only when P and Q agree
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(i.e. synchronise) to perform them. (We use this restricted form of the
parallel operator. The more general form allows processes to selectively
synchronise on events.)
P ||| Q represents the interleaved parallel composition. P and Q evolve sep-
arately, and do not synchronize on their events.
P ; Q is a sequential, rather than parallel, composition. It behaves as P until
and unless P terminates successfully: its subsequent behaviour is that of
Q .
P \ A is the CSP abstraction or hiding operator. This process behaves as P
except that events in set A are hidden from the environment and are solely
determined by P ; the environment can neither observe nor inﬂuence them.
Appendix B. A taste of a CSP Stable Failures Model
This model, described more fully in books [21,23], is an extension of the traces
model which can represent nondeterministic behaviour in an elegant way. It is
a simpliﬁed model in that it deals only with refusal sets rather than divergences
and is restricted to ﬁnite alphabets. It supports reasoning about liveness
through the use of refusal sets, it distinguishes deterministic (external) from
nondeterministic (internal) choice, and it distinguishes deadlock from livelock,
but it does not handle unbounded nondeterminism. The intuition for this
failures model is that a process P is characterised by a set of failures. A
failure is a pair (s ,X ) with s a ﬁnite sequence drawn from the universal set Σ
of events which the process may engage in, and X a subset of Σ. The sequence
s is called a trace and the set X is called a refusal . The pair model the notion
that the process may engage in the trace s , after which it may refuse any event
in X . If a process may nondeterministically do or refuse an event x ∈ Σ after
trace s , both (s , {x}) and (s  〈x 〉, {}) are failures for it. The set of failures
F satisfy the following axioms.
F1. The set of traces, T , is non-empty and preﬁx closed. Any failure (s ,X )
must have its trace s recorded in T .
F2. (s ,X ) ∈ F ∧ Y ⊆ X ⇒ (s ,Y ) ∈ F
If a process can refuse all events in ﬁnite set X then it can also refuse all
subsets of Y .
F3. (s ,X ) ∈ F ∧ (∀ c ∈ Y ⊆ α(P) • ((s  〈c〉, {}) /∈ F ⇒ (s ,X ∪ Y ) ∈ F
An event which is impossible as a next step can be included in a refusal set;
it follows that after s , an event x must appear as a next step or in a refusal.
F4. s  〈√〉 ∈ T ⇒ (s  〈√〉,X ) ∈ F
If a process can terminate, it can refuse to do anything, that is, any set is
refused.
To illustrate how CSP operations are deﬁned with failures semantics, the
failures for the preﬁxing, internal choice, external choice and parallel opera-
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tions are given below.
F [[a → P ]] = {(〈〉,X ) | a /∈ X } ∪ {(〈a〉 s ,X ) | (s ,X ) ∈ F [[P ]]}
F [[P✷Q ]] = {(〈〉,X | (〈〉,X ) ∈ F [[P ]] ∩ F [[Q ]]}
∪{(s ,X ) | s /∈ 〈〉 ∧ (s ,X ) ∈ F [[P ]] ∪ F [[Q ]]}
F [[PQ ]] = F [[P ]] ∪ F [[Q ]]
F [[P ‖A Q ]] = {(u,X ∪ Y ) | X \ (A ∪ {
√}) = Y \ (A ∪ {√})
∧ ∃ s , t .(s , t) ∈ F(P)
∧ (t ,Y ) ∈ F(Q)
∧ u ∈ s ‖A t}
The parallel operator is deﬁned so that P and Q can independently perform
events outside of A, but have to cooperate on A; that is, the combination
can refuse to do any event in A whenever either process can refuse it. The
trace-level parallel operator s ‖A t produces the set of all traces that could
arise if P and Q respectively communicate s and t .
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